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WELFARE SEARCHES-LAcK OF CONSENT RENDERS EARLY
MORNING MASS WELFARE RAIDS UNCONSTITUTIONAL; CON-
DITIONING RECEIPT OF WELFARE BENEFITS UPON GIVING OF
CONSENT HELD INVALID. Parrish v. Civil Serviie Comm'n (Cal.
1967).
Benny Max Parrish, a social worker, refused to participate in an
early morning, mass welfare raid1 on the grounds that it violated the
constitutional rights of the welfare recipients.2 Following his dis-
charge by the Civil Service Commission for insubordination, he
petitioned to the Superior Court of Alameda County for a writ of
mandamus to compel his reinstatement. The superior court denied
his petition and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.4 On
appeal to the California Supreme Court, held, reversed: The mass
raids were unconstitutional for lack of legally effective consent, and
the county could not constitutionally condition the continued receipt
of welfare benefits upon the giving of such consent. Petitioner's belief
in the illegality of the raids constituted sufficient justification for his
refusal to participate. 5 Parrish v. Civil Service Commission of the
County of Alameda, 66 Adv. Cal. 253, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967).
The arguments of the court are limited to a ,discussion of mass
1 The raid, dubbed "Operation Bedcheck," commenced at 6:30 a.m. on a Sunday
morning for the express purpose of determining the presence of unauthorized male
visitors in the homes of the welfare recipients. Over half of the homes were selected
for their non-suspect character. The raid was conducted in a dragnet fashion by teams
of welfare workers, one being familiar with the recipient. The worker known to the
recipient knocked at the front door while the other covered the back door of the dwell-
ing. Although permission to enter was requested, the recipient was aware that a refusal
could be characterized as "uncooperative" and constitute grounds for terminating
benefits. Once admitted, the workers conducted a thorough search of the dwelling with
special emphasis on places of concealment. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Adv. Cal.
at 256, 425 P.2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (1967).
2 The welfare recipients were primarily mothers with dependent children, living
apart from male spouses, and receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, granted pursuant to CAL. WaLF. & INST.
CODE § 11250 (West 1966).
8 66 Adv. Cal. at 259, 425 P.2d at 226, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
4 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), vacated,
66 Adv. Cal. 253, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967). The decision of the
District Court of Appeals was criticized in, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 228 (1966) (questioning
the court's ruling by demonstrating the incompatibility of mass welfarc searches with
the edict of the fourth amendment).
5 The court's holding relative to the justification of Parrish's refusal to participate
is based on 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964). See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282
P.2d 905. See also Annot., 50 A.L.R. 2d 513 (1955).
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welfare raids.6 If the case is so limited,7 Parrish raises little contro-
versy in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions
supporting individual rights." The significance of Parrish lies not in
its settled issues but rather in its ramifications relative to the legality
of welfare searches conducted without warrants, particularly with
regard to the later United States Supreme Court decision in Camara
v. Municipal Court.9 Decided after Parrish, Camara revitalized the
requirement of warrants for administrative searches, thereby eradi-
cating a former distinction between administrative and criminal
searches, contrived by the United States Supreme Court in Frank v.
Maryland.10
An examination of Parrish reveals undecided issues not subse-
quently resolved by Camara. As a result, the legality of warrantless
welfare searches remains open to conjecture. Despite Parrish's con-
demnation of mass welfare raids, there is no suggestion that all
welfare searches conducted without warrants are illegal. This ambi-
valence becomes apparent when the court: (1) distinguishes welfare
searches from the public health inspections in Frank,1 (2) doubts
the possibility of obtaining legally effective consent for welfare
searches, 12 (3) and yet conceives of a warantless welfare search as
a condition to receipt of benefits.la
6 66 Adv. Cal. at 259, 425 P.2d at 226, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 626. The court stated,
"we must determine, as a central issue in the present case, the constitutionality of the
searches contemplated and undertaken in the course of the operation."
7 Id. at 256, 425 P.2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The court implies this limitation
by a statement to the effect that "[it had] decided that the county's failure [to obtain
consent) . . . rendered the mass raids unconstitutional."
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (held that an individual taken into
custody for questioning is entitled to certain enumerated procedural safeguards as
protection for his privilege against self-incrimination); Elfbrandt v. Russell 384 U.S.
11 (1966) (held unconstitutional an Arizona loyalty oath required of state employees
because it interfered with the individuals freedom of association guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (invalidated a Virginia poll tax because it violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966),
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966) (upheld the individual's right of free expression under the first amend-
ment in respect to printing allegedly obscene publications, although two of the con-
victions were afrmed due to the method of promotion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) ("the right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours"); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the court held that products of unlawful searches and
seizures are inadmissable in state courts). Compare with Co, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966).
1 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
10 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (upholding a Balimore Ordinance authorizing warrantless
health inspections).
11 66 Adv. Cal. at 260-61, 425 P.2d at 227-28, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28.
12 Id. at 261-63, 425 P.2d at 228-30, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628-30.
13 Id. at 262-65, 425 P.2d at 229-32, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630-33.
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Because the search in Parrish was conducted by welfare workers,"4
the county claimed that the doctrine in Frank obviated the need for
a search warrant. The court, therefore, was compelled to distinguish
welfare raids from the administrative searches sustained in Frank
and did so on four points.
First, Parrish noted that unlike the searches sanctioned by the Balti-
more Ordinance'8 in Frank, the raids by the Alameda County author-
ities revealed evidence which in itself would be a basis for criminal
prosecution.'6 The Parrish raids were designed for the purpose of
detecting the presence of unauthorized males.'7 The criminal charge
to which the court alludes would be grand theft.'8 Yet, the presence
of a man in a welfare recipient's home is not conclusive proof that
the recipient is guilty of that crime.'9 Welfare fraud is a form of
grand theft and is based on misrepresentation of eligibility; 0 thus a
recipient would have to be found guilty of reporting false informa-
tion to be used in redetermining eligibility.2 1 The presence of a man
14 Id. at 256, 425 P.2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 625. "[Dlespite the fact that
the county's social workers did not ordinarily conduct fraud investigations, their services
were necessary for this undertaking."
15 BALTiMORE, MD., HEALTH CODE art. 12, § 120. The pertinent section provides:
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a
nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein
in the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the
same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such
refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars.
16 66 Adv. Cal. at 260, 425 P.2d at 227, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
17 Id. at 256, 425 P.2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
18 CAL. PEN. CODE § 484 (West 1955) provides:
Every person . . . who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or
fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money. ..
or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his wealth . . . is guilty
of theft.
Under this section, obtaining welfare funds by misrepresentation constitutes theft by
false pretenses or by false representation. See generally People v. Darling, 230 Cal. App.
2d 615, 41 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1964).
19 CA.. PEN. CODE § 484 (West 1955).
20 230 Cal. App. 2d at 617, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
21 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11054 (West 1966), see note 30 infra; CAL. WELF.
& INsT. CODE § 11351 (West 1966) specifies:
Where a needy child lives with his mother and a stepfather or an adult male
person assuming the role of spouse to the mother although not legally married
to her, the amount of the grant ... shall be computed after consideration is
given to the income of the stepfather or such male person.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11265 (West 1966) states:
The county shall at the time of such redetermination, and may monthly or at
such other intervals as may be deemed necessary, require the family to complete
a certificate of eligibility containing a written declaration of such information
as may be required to establish the continuing eligibilty and amount of
grant ....
These provisions mean that a failure to report income from some source other than that
already indicated on the forms results in a misdemeanor charge of perjury. For such
misrepresentations a felonious indictment under the grand theft sections of the Penal
Code would not be improbable. See note 18 supra.
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in a recipient's home or the finding of male clothing and personal
effects, merely constitutes an evidentiary link toward the ultimate
fact of misrepresentation. In addition to such evidence, further cul-
pable conduct is required to convict a recipient under the California
Penal Code.22
Second, the searches in Parrish allegedly produced evidence for
criminal prosecution or forfeiture of benefits23 whereas the Frank
Court limited its approval to searches advancing the general welfare.
Parrish presumes that forfeiture of welfare benefits is tantamount
to a forfeiture of property as conceived in the Constitution 4 and
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.2 5 However, the
recipient only becomes eligible for future payments when he complies
with the requirements enumerated in the California Welfare Code. 0
By not complying with these provisions, the recipient is ineligible for
future payments and cannot be said to "forfeit" what was never
rightfully his. Only by an overly broad construction can welfare
benefits be equated with the property rights envisioned by the Con-
stitution.
Third, like the Baltimore Ordinance, Parrish condemns searches
of a non-suspect recipient's home. On the other hand, the Frank
ordinance authorizes warrantless health searches for suspected
nuisances, the implication being that a suspect recipient may properly
be subjected to warrantless invasions of his home. But is due process
obtained when the welfare authorities conducting the searches deter-
mine those who are suspect? The purpose of the warrant procedure
is to provide a disinterested body with the opportunity to evaluate
22 See note 18 supra.
23 66 Adv. Cal. at 260, 425 P.2d at 227, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. V "EN~o person shall ...be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . ."; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 [No state
shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
Neither embrace welfare benefits within the property concept. This conclusion may
logically be inferred from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), which held that accrued Social Security benefits were not
property rights within the meaning of the Constitution. Certainly, if accrued benefits
are not considered "property rights," then future welfare benefits dependent upon the
recipient's continued eligibility would have no greater stature.
2G Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) (dictum). The Court
argued, "We are also clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of
declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him,
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal."
26 CAL. WaLF. & INST. CODE § 11054 (West 1966) provides:
Each applicant shall be required before approval of assistance or services to
file an affirmation setting forth his belief that he meets the specific conditions
of eligibility.
27 66 Adv. Cal. at 261, 425 P.2d at 228, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
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the justification for issuance of a warrant in order to prevent in-
discriminate invasions of privacy.28
Fourth, the court explicitly, condemns early morning searches
causing "inconvenience to the occupants," 29 while apparently con-
doning the "orderly visits in the middle of the afternoon" acknowl-
edged in Frank. Thus a search without a warrant made at a
"convenient" hour seemingly is not within the purview of the court's
prohibition.
These arguments, with respect to the four distinctions, are not
only inconclusive when applied to mass welfare raids, but dearly
imply that welfare searches without warrants may be justified for
the same reasons advanced in Frank. By comparing the method of
investigation in Parrish's "Operation Bedcheck"' 0 with the searches
sanctioned by Frank, the court infers that both are basically the same
type of administrative search. If the welfare authorities provide safe-
guards' similar to those incorporated in the Baltimore Ordinance,
then such warrantless welfare searches would apparently satisfy the
constitutional limitations emphasized in Parrish. In deciding the
constitutionality of welfare searches, as opposed to public health
inspections,32 inconsistent conclusions resulted when Parrish and
Frank were distinguished on their facts. It must be concluded that
welfare searches without warrants, conducted under different cir-
cumstances and at different hours, may not necessarily be prohibited,
and only a case by case examination can determine their constitu-
tionality.
Turning to another aspect of Parrish the county contended that
"the searches took place pursuant to effective consent, freely and
voluntarily given."3 Since welfare authorities customarily request
28 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). "Its [the warrant clause]
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in . . . ferreting out
crime." Accord, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
29 66 Adv. Cal. at 261, 425 P.2d at 228, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
80 See note 1 supra.
31 If the welfare administrators establish that: (1) no property right, in the
constitutional sense (see text accompanying notes 27-30 supra) is subject to a forfei-
ture; (2) the threat of criminal prosecution is removed; (3) adequate cause has
prompted the search; and (4) the searches are conducted during daylight hours without
inconvenience to the recipients, then such warrantless welfare searches would not differ
from the inspections sanctioned in Prank.
32 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
33 66 Adv. Cal. at 261, 425 P.2d at 228, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
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permission to enter a recipient's dwelling,84 the consent obtained is
vitiated by virtue of the officials position35 Parrish warrants this
conclusion because the customary practice in Alameda County was to
terminate welfare benefits for a reported refusal of entry. However,
"the question [of consent] is one of fact to be determined in light of
all the circumstances"3 7 and, mere assertion of authority does not
necessarily preclude an effective consent 8 Arguably, the amorphous
threat of authority, coupled with a request for entry under the aus-
pices of a welfare search, may render a consent ineffective due to a
recipient's awareness of the welfare official's virtual "unlimited
power over [his] ... very livelihood."39 Yet, the peculiar character-
istics of a welfare recipient, particularly his lack of education,
limited economic capabilities, and utter dependence upon welfare for
subsistence, lend credence to the court's arguments. Although the
Alameda practice is probably the exception rather than the rule,
the unique circumstances of any welfare recipient justify in other
welfare searches the Parrish court's approval41 of Iudd v. United
States which held that "the government must show a consent that is
unequivocal and specific, freely and voluntarily given."
42
Conditioning enjoyment of governmental benefits on waiver of
constitutional rights is an area of much controversy3 Although the
court demonstrates that the doctrine of "unconstitutional condi-
tions"44 is inapplicable to the raids in Parrish, three criteria are set
34 Id.
35 Id. at 262, 425 P.2d at 229, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
36 Id. at 261, 425 P.2d at 228, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
87 People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 753, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (1955).
38 People v. Campuzano, 254 Adv. Cal. App. 60, 65, 61 Cal. Rptr. 695, 698 (1967).
The court found that the defendant freely consented to the search conducted "without
any assertion of authority." This case is distinguishable from welfare cases because
the facts reveal that the defendant was not concerned with the "amorphous threats" of
the police. Defendant knew that the object of the search was evidence of narcotics, and
he believed that there were none in his home.
89 66 Adv. Cal. at 263, 425 P.2d at 229, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
40 CAL. DEP'T SOCIAL WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF RECIPIENTS OF AID TO
NEEDY CHILDREN, RESEARCH SERIEs REPORT No. 20, July 1963.
Out of 86,000 ANC [now AFDC or Aid to Families with Dependent
Children] mothers in California one-third have eighth grade educations or
less, one-third have ony partially completed high school, and only twenty-one
per cent have graduated from high school.
41 66 Adv. Cal. at 262, 425 P.2d at 229, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
42 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
43 Compare French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. LJ. 234
(1961), with O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966).
44 See Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions And Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 321 (1935).
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forth which, if present, may justify a waiver of constitutional rights
in other welfare searches:4 5 (1) the conditions must relate to the
justification for the benefit;40 (2) the value accruing from imposition
of the conditions "outweighs any resulting impairment of constitu-
tional rights . " ;47 and (3) "there are no alternative means less
subversive of constitutional right ...48 available relating to "the
purpose contemplated by conferring the benefit ... .,"49 No authority
is cited to support this remarkable conclusion. In dismissing the
county's claim that benefits may be withheld from recipients not
submitting to random, exploratory searches,10 the court concluded
that there was no correlation between the particular condition in
Parrish and the intended purpose of the benefit.51
The authority cited, both approving and disapproving conditioned
receipt of benefits,52 deals almost exclusively with first amendment
freedoms.53 Without attempting to elevate fourth amendment rights
45 66 Adv. Cal. at 263, 425 P.2d at 230, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 631. The Parrish court
was most explicit when stating:
Although we can conceive of unusual situations in which the government
might properly predicate continued welfare eligibility upon consent to unan-
nounced early morning searches, the record fails to develop any justification
for such a condition here (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 265, 425 P.2d at 230, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 263-64, 425 P.2d at 230-31, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 266, 425 P.2d at 231, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
51 Id. at 263-64, 425 P.2d at 230-31, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32. The court concluded by
saying:
[S]o striking is the disparity between the operation's declared purpose and the
means employed, so broad its gratuitous reach, and so convincing the evidence
that improper considerations dictated its ultimate scope, that no valid link
remains between that operation and its proferred justification.
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted how the searches were to include non-suspect
recipients as a means to prove a low incidence of welfare fraud.
52 Id. at 262, 425 P.2d at 229, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630. Despite the court's conclusion
that welfare benefits may be conditioned on waiver of constitutional rights, (see note
43 supra) the main premise of the argument was that the government lacked power
to condition the receipt of benefits.
53 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (dealt with a condition requiring
plaintiff to work on a Saturday, which was contrary to her religious beliefs); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidated a California statute requiring as a
precondition to certain tax exemptions a statement from the petitioner that he would not
advocate the overthrow of government by unlawful means); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U.S. 146 (1946) (held that an order of the Postmaster General to censor mail was
unconstitutional); Rosenfield v. Malcom, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 421 P.2d 697, 55 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1966) (ruled that a civil service employee could not be dismissed for political
activities displeasing to his superior); Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist.,
65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) (held invalid a regulation
which imposed restrictions on nurses aides' political activities); Fort v. Civil Sere.
Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964) (argued that restrictions
on county officers to cast votes or to express opinions were invalid in light of related
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above first amendment rights, two distinctions seem evident. First,
restricting freedoms under the first amendment as a precondition to
governmental affiliation may be justified for societal welfare,"'
whereas the benefit derived from withholding one's fourth amend-
ment right is purely economic since the purpose of such unannounced
searches is the elimination of fraudulent welfare practices. Second,
surrendering the right to freedom of expression as a precondition to
governmental employment is essentially voluntary because the pro-
spective employee retains a choice of employment; 5 on the other
hand, the welfare recipient has no alternatives and must accede to
the conditions accompanying the aid in order to obtain minimal sub-
sistence.
These distinctions require considerably more justification for a
waiver of a welfare recipient's fourth amendment rights than the
reasons submitted by the court. One writer has suggested numerous
criteria for determining conditioned receipt of welfare benefits. 6
Although the criteria are designed to prevent abuses, the lack of a
voluntary choice, while requiring a sacrifice of constitutional rights,
relegates these potential recipients to second class citizenry. Welfare
then becomes openly demeaning and the accompanying stigmas may
one day cause society to rue such conditions.
At this point a discussion of Camara is imperative because the
sweeping doctrine of the United States Supreme Court requiring
either consent or a warrant for searches under any circumstances,
first amendment rights) ; Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171
P.2d 885 (1946) (appellants successfully contested certain loyalty oaths as a precon-
dition to use of a school auditorium); O'Neil, supra note 41, at 443 (discussed a
balancing of criteria for conditioned welfare benefits but did not suggest any abridge-
ment of fourth amendment rights); French, supra note 41, at 234 (suggested that
government imposed conditions may infringe upon fourth and fifth amendment rights).
54 Note, Review of Welfare Practices, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 84, 101 n.104 (1967)
("regulation of free expression . . . is deemed to serve societal values beyond the
merely personal rights to freedom ... ).
55 A government employee is faced with the choice of waiving his right to free
expression and working for the government or retaining government employment. He
is not precluded from obtaining employment where waiver of such rights is not required.
SO O'Neil, supra note 41, at 463-74. Eight criteria are listed which may be useful
in evaluating particular conditions. A condition need not comply with all the criteria
since some may not be appropriate. Essentially a condition may be valid: (1) if the
object of the condition could be achieved in no other way; (2) if the condition is
relevant to the benefit conferred; (3) providing that no alternative means would
achieve the same end; (4) considering the degree of importance which the benefit
means to the recipient; (5) whether equivalent benefits were available in the private
sector; (6) depending on the manner in which the condition influences the beneficiary's
judgment; (7) considering the form in which the condition is imposed; and (8) if
proper procedures are provided for determining a breach of condition.
1968)
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may render the questions raised by Parrish moot. In Camara the
appellant refused to allow a warrantless inspection by city housing
inspectors who had reason to believe that appellant was violating
the occupancy permit of his apartment building.57 After appellant
unsuccessfully demurred to a criminal complaint filed by the city, he
appealed a denial of his subsequent writ of prohibition against further
criminal proceedings. In overruling Frank8 the Court held:
[A] dministrative searches of the kind at issue here, are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant
procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees to the individual .... 59
Moreover, the Court did not concede that broad statutory safeguards
were a substitute for individualized review. 0 Nevertheless, the ruling
was not all inclusive since the Court added "except in certain care-
fully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a
valid search warrant.""1
When the legality of welfare searches is considered in view of
Camara, a question arises whether these searches are to be exempt
from the penumbra of the doctrine. Camara does not define any of
the excepted classes of cases, and explicitly limits its holding to
administrative searches of the kind at issue. The effect of these quali-
fying phrases may be intended to restrict the ruling in Camara to
public health and safety searches. If so, Camara may not have resolved
the legality of administrative searches of a different nature; thus, the
issue will remain undecided until presented to the Court for adjudi-
cation.
Furthermore, several differences between public health inspections
and public welfare searches provide justification for excluding the
latter from the penumbra of Camara. Inspections conducted with the
object of discovering disease, protecting public health, and locating
57 387 U.S. at 523.
U8 Id. at 534. Accord, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (decided in con-
junction with Camara). Appellant refused to permit a warrantless inspection of his
commercial warehouse. In applying the Camara ruling, the Court stated, "[wje hold
only that the basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment-
that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure-is applicable in this
context, as in others, to business as well as to residential premises." Id. at 546.
59 Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 533.
61 Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 5
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safety hazards are preventive by nature and require a narrow inter-
pretation of constitutional limitations since public well-being is the
motivating force. Searches conducted by welfare authorities to verify
a welfare recipient's eligibility are motivated by punitive and eco-
nomic interests. Noncompliance with safety standards may result
in danger to life and limb thus justifying a departure from strict
constitutional limitations.62 On the other hand, misrepresentation of
welfare eligibility touches, at most, on the periphery of our economic
interests,6 3 and is far less crucial to public health and safety. In light
of these differences, investigatory methods adaptable to health inspec-
tions may not be applicable to welfare searches.
But assuming that welfare searches do not differ in kind from the
inspections treated in Camara, at least one other distinguishing factor
has consequence. Although the Court broadly construed the "warrant
clause" of the fourth amendment,6 4 a new dimension to probable
cause was formulated. 5 In reference to public health inspections, the
general conditions of a geographical area may now constitute suffi-
dent grounds for issuance of a warrant.66 While such an inter-
62 Emergency situations have traditionally dictated qualification of otherwise secured
rights. See, e.g., North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (provided that there was no right of notice or opportunity to be heard for
persons whose property [food] is seized as unwholesome and unfit for use); Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (found that compulsory vaccination did not
violate individual rights since personal liberties are subject to restraints in order to
secure the general comfort and health of the people); Compagnie Francaise v. Louisi-
ana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (ruled that the state possessed power
to restrain the movement of healthy persons in localities "infested with contagious or
infectious disease"); Pennsylvania v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 32 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966) (held that warrants were not required in searches inci-
dent to a lawful arrest).
63 For the twelve month period, July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, the average number
(per month) of welfare recipient cases in the AFDC program was 146,912. CAL.
DEP'T OF SocrAL WELFARE, THE ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, RESEARCHi AND
STATISTIcS, Table 1 (1966). According to a 1963 California welfare study report, the
highest percentage of all welfare fraud exists in the AFDC program. CAL. WELFARE
STUDY COM 'N CONSULTANTS' REPORT, PART Two, at 281-83 (Jan. 1963). Yet, in
the AFDC program the Department of Social Welfare published statistics for 1966
revealing an average for a three month period, of 1,828 suspected fraud cases, of which
only one-third were referred to the District Attorney for prosecution. CAL. DEP'T OF
SOCIAL WELFARE, RECIPIENT FRAUD REPORT, RESEARCH AND STATISTICS (1967).
These figures indicate that out of 146,912 AFDC cases, approximately 200 suspected
fraud cases were reported monthly to the District Attorney for prosecution, or less
than .15 percent.
64 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
65 387 U.S. at 534-35.
66 Id. at 536-38. This construction was based on similar arguments used by Justice
Frankfurter to support the distinction in Frank, and allowed the Court to effect sub-
stantively what they emasculated procedurally. Dissenting in Camara, Justice Clark
criticized the "new-fangled 'warrant' system that is entirely foreign to Fourth Amend-
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pretation is relevant to health and safety inspections, it is clearly
inappropriate for welfare searches designed to detect fraud. Mis-
representation of eligibility can only be ascertained by a study of
individual characteristics, not area conditions; therefore the general
existence of welfare fraud does not provide a justifiable basis for
probable cause.
Aside from issues raised by Camara and Parrish, consideration
should be given to state and federal administrative regulations gov-
erning the practices of welfare agencies. 7 Initially, the Parrish
court intimates that the questionable legality of mass warrantless
raids is no longer in controversy due to the publication of these
regulations. Despite this intimation, two questions remain unan-
swered: (1) In what respect do these regulations prohibit or sanction
welfare searches conducted without warrants? (2) What is the force
and effect of these regulations as restraints on the agencies and as
protection for the recipients?
First, the state welfare regulation 8 dearly prohibits "mass, in-
discriminate or dragnet home visits . . ."69 but does not preclude
warrantless searches in other situations such as random inspections. 70
In fact, unannounced searches at any time of day are authorized.71
ment standards." He noted that history supported the Frank ruling; and the current
need for health and safety inspections, unencumbered by a restrictive warrant procedure,
substantiated adherence to that holding. In his final argument, Justice Clark attacked
the creation of "paper warrants" resulting from the "prostitution" of the warrant
procedure.
67 CAL. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE BULL. No. 624 (Revised), V (B), effective
September 1, 1963 (hereinafter cited as CAL. BULL.) and UNTED STATES DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUB. AssisTANcE ADM. HANDBOOK
TRANSMITrAL No. 77, effective July 1, 1967 (hereinafter cited as FED. HANDBOOK).
68 The pertinent sections of the state bulletin are:
Home visits at any time of the day, announced or unannounced, are proper.
However, when made outside regular office hours or on other than regular
working days, they are to be made only during reasonable hours of normal
family activity. Mass, indiscriminate or dragnet home visits are not to be used
either for the purpose of fraud detection or for the purposes of deterring fraud.
They are not to be used as a method of testing the accuracy of eligibility
decisions. Search of the home or property of a recipient by welfare department
staff for evidence of fraud is prohibited. Evidence may be observed and noted.
It may be removed from the premises only with the owner's permission. Re-
cipients are entitled to due process of law.
At all times it is incumbent upon welfare department staff to conduct them-
selves with courtesy and with recognition of the rights of all persons involved.
CAL. BULL. § V (B).
69 CAL. BULL. § V (B).
70 The regulation does not consider such other situations, therefore, it may be
assumed that such warrantless inspections are not within its prohibition.
71 See note 68 supra.
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The recent federal regulation72 does not proscribe welfare searches
without warrants although it does restrict "visits"' 78 outside normal
working hours.
Second, despite such governmental attempts to curb many of the
questionable investigatory practices, considerable .doubt remains as
to the force and effect of these regulations. If the promulgated regul-
lations are: (1) within the granted power of the enacting agency;
(2) pursuant to proper procedure; and (3) reasonable, then they
should have the force of law.74 Whether the regulations do have
such effect and afford constitutional protection is a question of judi-
cial interpretation. Regrettably neither the state nor federal regula-
tions have been examined by the courts.
If judicial review is the only way to evaluate the constitutionality
of these regulations, or the only way to ensure agency compliance,
then a real "case or controversy" must arise.75 However, few welfare
recipients are aware of constitutional concepts 70 or possess knowledge
or finances with which to seek meaningful legal advice. In fact, the
constitutionality of the Alameda County raids would never have been
questioned except for the rather unusual occurrence of a social
worker's refusal to participate in an activity which he believed vio-
lated the constitutional rights of the recipients. But assuming a "case
or controversy" arose, a further question to resolve is whether the
provisions of the regulations are mandatory or merely recom-
72 FED. HANDBOOK, PT. IV, § 2220 (1966) requiring state conformance by July 1,
1967. The pertinent provisions prescribe as follows:
The requirement that a State plan contain policies and procedures for de-
termination of eligibility that are consistent with program objectives and that
respect legal rights of individuals and do not violate the individual's privacy
or personal dignity, or harass him or violate his constitutional rights, neces-
sitates the testing of each pertinent policy and procedure against those positive
and negative criteria ....
States must especially guard against violations in such areas as entering
a home by force, or without permission, or under false pretenses, making
home visits outside of working hours, and particularly making such visits
during sleeping hours; and searching in the home, for example, in rooms,
closets, drawers, or papers to seek clues to possible deception.
Id. at § 2230.
78 "Visits" are not defined in the federal regulation, yet the scope of the visit, as
provided in the regulation, implies that the term may be used interchangeably with
inspections or searches. See note 72 supra.
74 1 DAvis, ADmNisTrATivE LAw TREATIsE, § 5.03, at 299 (1958).
75 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911):
By cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants brought before
the courts by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom
for the protection or enforcement of rights or the prevention, redress, or pun-
ishment of wrongs.
76 See note 40 supra.
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mended.7 7 Unfortunately, resolution of this question is beyond the
scope of this comment.
Previous discussion leads to the conclusion that the Parrish court
was apparently neither compelled nor motivated to render judgment
beyond the constitutionality of the early morning mass raids, al-
though portions of the court's arguments condemning those raids
are dearly relevant to warrantless welfare searches. Camara, if not
limited to public health inspections, may either specifically exempt
welfare searches from the holding or simply be inapplicable because
of differences in the respective searches.
An observation is in order: At one time, the United States
Supreme Court sanctioned searches without warrants in administra-
tive cases, yet insisted on strict compliance with constitutional stan-
dards in searches conducted for criminal prosecution. 8 After
Camara, searches conducted with the object of advancing the general
health and safety required a valid warrant.y If criminal searches and
administrative inspections represent two extremes, welfare searches
must be cast between these polarities. These welfare searches possess
characteristics germane to both in that they are designed: (1) to
apprehend and punish individual abuses,80 and (2) to provide
efficient allocation of public funds.81 On this basis, the protection
given to public safety inspections would dearly apply to public
welfare searches.
However, an equally important consideration is the great avenue
for fraud provided by welfare assistance; accordingly, the plight of
the welfare agencies must not go unheeded. If welfare administra-
tors must now obtain warrants for all searches, it may be too burden-
some to require the same degree of probable cause demanded in
criminal investigations. Camara may offer a solution. The new dimer-
sion of probable cause articulated by Camara may be precedent for
a similar approach. Perhaps a broader interpretation of probable
cause would be appropriate with respect to searches conducted for
the redetermination of welfare eligibility. To the extent that public
77 67 CoLUm. L. Rav. 87 & n.27 (1967).
78 See text accompanying notes 10 & 23 supra.
79 See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
80 Compare note 1 supra, with Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches And The Social
Security Act, 72 YALEI .J. 1347 (1963).
81 66 Adv. Cal. at 265-67, 425 P.2d at 231-32, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32. It is
understandable that the general public would be interested in the proper utilization of




interest in the proper allocation of welfare funds vindicates such a
construction, an evaluation of the following seems relevant: (1)
benefit to be derived by the public; (2) harm or hardship to be
suffered by the recipient; (3) other methods available to detect
welfare fraud; (4) frustration of governmental purpose in the ad-
ministration of welfare programs; and (5) reasonableness of the
initial suspicion. Of course, this presents an anomalous situation in
which the court liberally construes one clause of the Constitution
to prevent erosion of safeguarded rights, only to reach a contrary
result by strictly interpreting another.
In the final analysis, the courts must strike a balance between
society's demands for efficient welfare administration and the indi-
vidual's right of privacy. The far reaching effects of Griswold v.
Connecticut 2 in defining this right of privacy 3 may foreshadow a
broad application of the fourth amendment's "warrant clause." A
welfare recipient's right to be free from warrantless welfare searches
of his home should remain paramount to a compromise advancing
the public interest.
RICHARD PETER SAX
82 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88 See generally Symposium-Griswold v. Connecticut and the Right of Privacy,
64 tcHi. L. REv. 197 (1965).
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